This paper explores the provision of schooling in colonial India when British administrators dictated education policy. Although public and private funds were used to expand and improve the public education system, there were fewer than 3 primary schools for every 10 villages as late as 1911. To explore the impact of the funding system on the provision of schools, I empirically analyze the links between local factors and schooling using a new historical dataset. I find that districts with higher levels of caste and religious diversity had fewer privately managed primary schools and fewer total primary schools. Heterogeneous preferences across groups, unequal political power in more diverse districts and low demand for education by lower castes are all potential explanations for this pattern. Broadly, the results highlight the challenges involved in the provision of primary education in the presence of numerous and perhaps unequal groups.
implications for India's growth path in the colonial and post-independence era. Theodore Schultz has written extensively on the importance of primary education to economic growth, specifically for a traditional agricultural economy, and suggests that more literate farmers are quicker to adopt superior inputs, engage in greater information sharing and thereby increase agricultural production.
4 Drèze and Sen (1998) also emphasize the substantially high social returns to primary education in India because greater literacy promotes public discourse, increases accountability of elected leaders and generally improves democratic governance.
5
Second, this is a particularly interesting setting given the high degree of diversity in Indian society that has significant consequences for public and private provision of schools. Indian society was divided along both caste and religious lines, and in addition there was also substantial inequality between castes whereby higher castes, at least in this period, enjoyed far greater economic and educational standing as compared to lower castes. Third, stronger insight of the historical circumstances can potentially guide current educational policies as India strives to achieve universal literacy.
Although British India was among the largest colonies of the British Empire, public investments on human capital were among the lowest in the world and lagged behind other colonies of the British Empire and even the Indian Princely States that were not under direct colonial authority. Moreover, less than 40% of public education expenditures were targeted to primary education. Due to the low level of public funding, private revenues became critical for the development of schooling and local district characteristics such as population shares of different social groups, the level of diversity and income strongly influenced private provision. The main empirical results in this paper show that districts with higher levels of caste and religious diversity (as measured by a Herfindahl index) had fewer total primary 4 See Schultz (1962) , Schultz (1963) , Schultz (1971) and Schultz (1983) . More generally, education has been linked to greater worker productivity and a faster ability to adopt new and existing technology. See Becker (1964) , Mincer (1974) , Easterlin (1981) , Romer (1990) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) among others who have emphasized the importance of education as human capital.
5 They also suggest that primary education has the potential to reduce long standing gender and caste inequities in India because it affords socially disadvantaged groups the "ability to resist oppression, to organize politically and to get a fairer deal." schools and fewer privately managed primary schools controlling for other economic and social factors. One potential explanation of this finding relates to heterogeneous preferences across groups, which perhaps increased coordination costs of mobilizing private resources for primary schooling. Another mutually nonexclusive explanation relates to unequal political power of elites that might have affected the availability of public funds that were still an important funding source for certain privately managed schools. Chaudhary (2007) explores public provision of local services by rural district boards that were heavily dominated by upper caste board members and finds that elites had stronger preferences for public investments on local infrastructure relative to primary schooling.
6 Although these interpretations emphasize supply-side constraints, low demand for education by lower castes can also account for fewer primary schools in more diverse areas given the strong reliance on private funding.
Another interesting result is that the level of diversity is negatively correlated with the ratio of primary to secondary schools that were privately funded and managed. This suggests that there was an undue private emphasis on secondary schooling. This is also supported by the finding that the upper caste Brahman population share is positively correlated with secondary schools but uncorrelated with primary schools. The empirical analysis also reveals other important patterns. Demand side variables like the fraction of professionals are positively associated with both primary and secondary schools, while land tax revenues are an important fiscal variable for publicly managed primary schools. Finally, the number of primary schools are highly correlated with subsequent literacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly describes the institutional history and discusses enrollment, expenditure and literacy patterns. This brief overview suggests that colonial policy created an important role for private funding in the development of the public school system. Section 3 lays out a theoretical framework to explore how local factors affected the supply of district-level public schools. This section emphasizes that Indian social structure was critical to the provision of schooling because of the presence of numerous castes and religions as well as the high level of inequality between castes. The various hypotheses put forward in section 3 are tested using a new historical dataset on 82 Indian districts, which is described in section 4. The empirical results are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional History
Colonial Policies
Over the course of the 19 th century, the indigenous system of schooling in British India was replaced by the new state system of education developed by the East India Company till 1857 and controlled by the British Crown from 1858 to 1919. Under the former indigenous system, schools were of two types-elite religious schools geared toward students interested in a lifetime of higher learning and local elementary schools where village boys were introduced to the 3 R's in the vernacular medium. 7 Due to lack of official patronage from the Company, both elite schools and local indigenous schools declined over this period.
Wood's Education Despatch of 1854 was the first official document akin to a national education policy, which outlined the Company's role with regard to the provision of schooling in British India. 8 The Despatch created an elaborate machinery of provincial education departments and established guidelines for the development of schools at the primary, secondary and collegiate level. While earlier policies had promoted "a very high degree of education for a small number of natives" 9 in the English medium, the Company now empha-7 For more details see Nurullah and Naik (1951) , chapter 1 and Basu (1982) . 8 The East India Company was generally indifferent to the provision of schooling until the early 19 th century when they set aside public funds for centers of classical learning and the promotion of western sciences in the English medium. Although no vigorous efforts were made to encourage local indigenous schools, the Company promoted English medium schools with the expectation that they would produce an elite group of educated Indians who could work in the colonial administrative offices. For more details see Sharp and Richey (1920) . 9 See Despatch to Government of India on the Subject of General Education in India (1854).
sized the importance of expanding vernacular primary schools for the rural masses. 10 Given the high costs of building such a system, the Despatch introduced public subsidies known as 'grant-in-aids' to partially support schools under private management that came to be known as aided schools.
11 By encouraging grant-in-aids, the East India Company created an important role for private enterprize and consequently private funds became a significant force in the expansion of the public school system.
Beginning in the 1860's, a new system of schooling emerged, which incorporated schools managed by provincial governments and local boards (district and municipal) as well as privately managed schools known as aided and unaided schools. Figure 1 presents a breakdown of the different school-types. While aided schools received public subsidies or grant-in-aids, unaided schools did not receive public grants but were nonetheless classified under the public system because their students were allowed to take public examinations offered by either education departments or colleges. Although many of the former indigenous schools disappeared over this period, some were successfully converted into public aided schools and the rest were classified as private schools because they were often religious in nature and did not conform to education department standards.
12
Over the second half of the 19 th century, there was a dramatic increase in the number of English medium aided and unaided secondary schools and colleges fueled by high private demand among educated elites. 13 The overall growth of secondary schools and colleges 10 English was established as the official language of instruction in 1835 by Governor General Bentinck following Macaulay's infamous minute that strongly criticized Oriental languages and literature, while promoting the study of western sciences and philosophy in the English medium. See Ghosh (2000) for more details.
11 Under this system, grants were available to schools that followed a secular curriculum (religious neutrality), were under private local management, and open to public inspection. Grants could be allocated to specific charges, for example teacher salaries or buildings. However, they could not cover all the operating expenditures of the institution and the Despatch mandated that eligible schools were required to charge fees, nominal if necessary, to encourage regular attendance. Provincial governments were given substantial leeway in framing grant eligibility rules.
12 From 1855 to 1882, the number of private schools declined by almost 50% from 49, 524 to 25, 166, while government and aided schools increased to 89, 005 by 1882. See Government of India (1883-84), Indian Education Commission Report for more details.
13 See Nurullah and Naik (1951) , Basu (1974), and Ghosh (2000) . For example, according to Basu (1974) the number of English secondary schools and arts colleges more than doubled from 1881/82 to 1921/22 from 2,133 to 4,904, while the number of pupils more than quintupled from 149,233 to 823,416 (page 105).
outpaced primary schools, and official reports highlighted the need to increase mass primary schooling.
14 For example, the Indian Education Commission Report of 1883 made primary education a subject of critical importance with a declaration that "elementary education of the masses, its provision, extension, and improvements, to be that part of the educational system to which the strenuous efforts of the State should now be directed in a still larger measure than heretofore." As part of the 1882 Resolution of Local Self-Government, the provision of primary education was decentralized to rural and urban boards, and they were encouraged to increase the number of primary schools by either building new schools or by offering public grants to privately managed schools (indigenous schools or new private schools , Progress of Education in India: Quinquennial Reviews.
15 There was tremendous provincial heterogeneity in school systems with certain provinces like Bombay developing a system of publicly managed board schools, while provinces like Bengal encouraged privately managed schools to apply for public grants.
16 Larger public grants were made available to schools in "backward districts", scholarships were introduced to encourage schooling among these groups, and training schools for teachers were established. 17 In the early 1900's, colonial officers began to view secondary schools and colleges as a breeding ground for political unrest against colonial rule and for rising nationalism among educated Indians. Consequently, numerous acts were passed both to increase efficiency and control over public institutions. Basu (1974) discusses at length the connection between the increase in secondary schooling and the rise of political consciousness among Indian elites, and the impact on subsequent state policy.
18 Gokhale, an Indian champion of primary education, introduced a private bill in 1911 that outlined a modest system of compulsory education for boys between the ages of six and ten. But the bill was rejected Before the laws could be enacted in all provinces, education was transferred to the control of provincial governments with Indian ministers as part of the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919. And, this marked the end of direct colonial responsibility toward education.
Quantitative Patterns
Although the British Crown created a new system of education, public investments on education were fairly low in British India as compared to other colonies and states. Davis and Huttenback (1986) , chapter 4 and appendix 4.1 for more details. Education is the dominant category of human capital expenditures, which also include spending on medicine, charity, relief, immigration and on occasion religion (as a matter of convenience when it was difficult to separate religious spending from education). For a small sample of countries and colonies, I double-checked reported public education expenditures against the human capital expenditures reported in Davis and Huttenback (1986) and they appear to follow the same pattern. 
24
Given British India's low level of literacy and economic development, one would imagine that private and social returns to primary education were probably higher in the colonial period. 25 Moreover, theoretical arguments by Schultz (1983) and Drèze and Sen (1998) Tables C1 and C3) . 22 See Nurullah and Naik (1951) , Basu (1974) , Basu (1982), and Whitehead (2005) . Mukhopadhyay (1984) provides various examples from Bengali newspapers and editorials that highlight how landed elites actively opposed the development of mass primary education.
23 See Nurullah and Naik (1951) and Basu (1974) along with Quinquennial Reviews of the period. 24 See Gounden (1967) , Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969) and Psacharopoulos (1973) . Heyneman (1980) and Asaoka (2006) provide a summary of rates of return studies in India.
25 Psacharopoulos (1973) has studied rates of return to education for a broad cross-section of countries and concludes that rates of return are generally higher in developing countries as compared to developed countries and returns are always highest for primary education.
Although the British Crown created a new public system of schooling, colonial policy was unsuccessful in substantially increasing enrollment or literacy. Lanka (8.94), Japan (13.07), and France (13.9). 27 Moreover, the differences are not entirely driven by differential demographic structures or enrollments in private schools. In 1900, the public primary school enrollment rate was 62.5% in France, 72% in the United Kingdom, 51% in Japan and a mere 4.7% in British India. Public secondary school enrollment was 1.1% in France, 0.7% in the United Kingdom, 1.3% in Japan and 0.9% in British India.
28
Thus, secondary school enrollment in British India was comparable to other countries, but primary education was far below average. The estimates for Hindu castes are based on caste samples from certain areas of the province and do not include an exhaustive list of castes belonging to each group. The groups are based on social precedence tables outlined in the census of 1901, which enumerated castes that belonged to twice-born rank (higher castes), clean sudras, inferior sudras, and lower castes. It is unclear a priori whether this would systematically bias the estimates unless the least literate lower castes and the most literate higher castes were the only castes enumerated in each group, which does not appear to be the case since there is significant variation within 'lower castes.' More often the census appears to have selected castes based on their numerical strength. Madras province is the exception where literacy rates were computed for all enumerated castes.
30 Colonial policy directed significant resources to increase Muslim enrollment in public schools and the Low demand for primary education was one of the common explanations put forward by British administrators for the low level of basic education, but certain official policies worsened pre-existing conditions-public schools were encouraged to charge fees, which probably raised the opportunity cost for the rural agricultural population and less than half public education expenditures were targeted to primary schooling. Due to the limited availability of public funds, the new system of education relied heavily on private support and the empirical analysis suggests that local district characteristics such as the degree of caste and religious diversity negatively affected private provision of primary schools.
Theoretical Framework
The discussion from section 2 suggests that private revenues in conjunction with official policy played a significant role in the development of the public school system. Therefore, this section explores how various local factors might have influenced the district-level demand and supply of schools.
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The literacy patterns from table 3 indicate that there was substantial heterogeneity in the demand for education between different castes and religions perhaps due to varying rates of return and opportunity costs. Therefore, the population shares of high caste Brahmans, lower castes, Muslims, and aboriginal tribes were probably critical to the availability of different school-types. Given Brahmans had above average literacy and were the traditional educated caste, we would expect the Brahman population share to be positively correlated with the number of schools. Moreover, Brahmans might have preferred secondary schools with attached primary classes because they offered superior instruction relative to vernacular primary schools. If this was the case, we would expect Brahmans to be positively correlated only with secondary schools.
It is unclear a priori how population shares of disadvantaged groups like the lower castes efforts were largely successful in bringing Muslim primary school enrollment on par with Hindus. 31 An Indian district is equivalent to a US county.
and aboriginal tribes were related to schools. Although they had extremely low literacy, missionaries were particularly active in promoting schools for them and colonial policy encouraged the development of schools in areas heavily populated by these groups. This suggests that schools managed and funded by provincial governments might be positively correlated with disadvantaged groups. Moreover, if missionaries relied on public grants, then lower castes and aboriginal tribes might also be positively associated with aided schools (privately managed schools that received grant-in-aids). Given Muslims preferred indigenous religious schools, we would expect their population share to be positively associated with private schools and negatively associated with public schools. However, provincial governments did establish schools specifically for Muslims and so their population share could be positively correlated with provincial government schools.
The emerging ethnic fragmentation literature suggests that social diversity might have negatively influenced the provision of education in British India because more ethnically diverse populations are less successful in providing local services such as schooling. 32 In the Indian context, heterogeneous preferences between different Hindu castes and religions could have raised the costs of mobilizing necessary resources to establish schools in more diverse districts. Moreover, the general inability of more heterogeneous districts to effectively work together might have disproportionately affected primary education because decentralized local boards managed the provision of primary schooling and Indian board members were in the position to influence public funding of aided schools. 33 To test the impact of diversity on public and private provision of schools, the empirical analysis includes a Herfindahl-based caste and religious fragmentation index as a measure of diversity.
Besides social structures, market economy and occupational composition were also important to the demand and supply of public schools. Districts with larger populations of doctors, teachers and lawyers (professionals) were more likely to promote and develop schools at all levels, while areas with larger agricultural populations might have placed a lower premium on education, particularly secondary schooling. In order to capture these effects the analysis includes the share of the district population supported by agriculture, industry, commerce, and professional employment.
Finally, higher income probably raised public and private revenues available to construct and operate schools. Since there are no data on district income, I include two proxies to capture income-income tax collections and land tax revenues per capita. Income taxes were generally collected from government employees and other workers who were part of the formal sector of the economy. Thus, they were collected from a small share of the population and reflect the higher tail of the formal income distribution. In comparison, land tax revenues capture the British assessment of the land value of the district. They also represent an important fiscal constraint on primary schools because additional levies on land taxes were an important source of revenues for rural district boards. Hence, we would expect land taxes to be positively correlated with primary schools managed by local boards.
Given the tremendous heterogeneity across Indian provinces, the district-level analysis includes province fixed effects to capture time-invariant provincial characteristics including policies set at the national or province-level. While province fixed effects absorb the variation across provinces in schooling policies and outcomes, they also control for differences in geography, caste structures, design of local boards, and other unobservables across provinces.
These factors are likely to be correlated with schools and would bias the coefficients on the independent variables. Thus, including province fixed effects reduces potential concerns of omitted variables and allows for a cleaner interpretation of the explanatory variables. The district gazetteers are part of the Imperial Gazetteer of India, which the British undertook to gain a stronger understanding of the culture, economy and geography of the Indian sub-continent. See Chaudhuri (1964) for a detailed history of the gazetteers.
35 For example, the Madras district gazetteers do not report detailed enrollment figures for the different school types-provincial government, local councils, aided and unaided. The detailed expenditure data are incomplete in 1901 and unreported for many districts in 1911. Even when the district gazetteers do report enrollment data, they are often unclear whether aggregate enrollment represent pupils enumerated on a certain date or average daily attendance. The Quinquennial Reviews suggest that enrollment data were not particularly accurate or reflective of average daily attendance. These concerns probably extend to the enrollment data in the gazetteers as well.
36 Madras district gazetteers only report school variables for 1902/03 and 1912/13. Bengal and Bombay only report the detailed breakdown of schools by management type-provincial government, local board (district and municipal), aided and unaided-for 1901/02 and 1911/12. in the Quinquennial Reviews.
37 Thus, the econometric analysis focuses on schools as the outcome variable with the sample restricted to districts in Bengal, Bombay and Madras with relatively complete data. 38 In addition to schooling variables, I also extracted data on income tax and land tax revenues from the gazetteers.
Using data from the colonial censuses, I constructed population, demographic, and occupational variables at the district-level. 39 Since there are concerns pertaining to the accuracy of finer occupational categories enumerated in the censuses, I constructed broad occupational types-agriculture, commerce, industry, and professions-to minimize measurement error. 38 Data on Bombay province does not include the six districts of Sind. The four small hill districts of Angul, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Darjeeling and Nilgiris are excluded because their data is generally incomplete. Moreover, the hill districts have very small populations and are extremely distinct from other districts in the sample. Finally, the analysis does not include the pure urban cities of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, which are again very different from the rest of the rural districts in the sample and for which comparable data is unavailable.
39 Government of India (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) 44 The 1901 census discusses potential problems with the age-specific enumeration, which introduces some measurement error in Y but is more likely to be random or classical measurement error that yields consistent estimates. Moreover, the results are unchanged for per-capita dependent variables, which are more accurately measured.
Muslims, Christians, and aboriginal tribes. X includes a set of controls to capture districtlevel development, income, and occupational structures. λ t is a dummy for the 1911 crosssection and controls for temporal patterns that uniformly affect all districts, δ p are province dummies to capture time-invariant province characteristics, and ε ipt is the district-specific error term.
45 Table 5 presents the first set of results. The first three columns have total schools, public schools-provincial government, local board (rural and urban), aided and unaided-and private indigenous schools as the dependent variable, while the last three columns focus on similar specifications for primary schools as the dependent variable. The results suggest that local factors were very important to the provision of schools in the early 20 th century.
Districts with a higher degree of caste and religious fragmentation are correlated with fewer total schools and in particular fewer public primary schools. We can interpret the CRFI coefficient as the change when a district moves from complete homogeneity (CRFI=0) to complete heterogeneity (CRFI=1) but a more intuitive interpretation within the sample context indicates that when CRFI increases by one standard deviation (from a mean of 0.724 to 0.876), total schools decrease by 0.724-a decrease of almost 25% from the mean value of total schools. The effects on total schools are largely driven by public primary schools where a one standard deviation increase in CRFI decreases the average number of public primary schools by 29%. Thus, the effects of CRFI are both economically and statistically significant.
Among the different castes and religions, the Brahman population share is negatively correlated with private indigenous schools, while Muslims are negatively correlated with total schools, especially public primary schools. These effects are also economically significant-if the Brahman population increases by one standard deviation (from a mean of 3.8% to 6.7%), Land tax revenues emerge as particularly important to public primary schools, which is as expected because additional levies on land taxes were an important source of revenues for local councils that were in charge of primary schooling. The land tax coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation rise in revenue increases the average number of public primary schools by 16%. Interestingly, none of the development controls are statistically significant although fraction rural is partially significant for primary schools. The development controls are strongly correlated with the population share of professionals-districts with larger populations of doctors, lawyers, and teachers were also more urban with higher population density.
And, so fraction profession probably reflects some effects of greater development. Fraction profession is positively correlated with all types of schools and the coefficient indicates that a one standard deviation increase (from a mean of 1.6% to 2.4%) in the professional share increases the mean value of total schools by 24%. Finally, the coefficient on the 1911 dummy suggests that the number of public schools increased from 1901 to 1911, while private schools decreased.
The evidence thus far suggests that local factors such as the degree of caste and religious diversity were important determinants of the provision of public primary schools. Given the heterogeneity of public school-types, it is difficult to interpret the findings on CRFI and isolate the specific underlying mechanisms. Therefore, the next set of results focus on individual school-types within the new public system-provincial government, local board, aided and unaided schools. I have also created an additional category of state supported schools, which is the sum of provincial government, local board and aided schools. Table 6 presents results for each school type at the primary-level. There were very few provincial government primary schools and specification 1 suggests that local characteristics were not critical to their supply. This is not too surprising given these schools were managed by education officers at the province-level.
Local board schools in specification 2 include both urban municipal schools and rural board schools, which were directly managed by local urban and rural boards respectively.
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Interestingly, CRFI is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude for these schools, which suggests that perhaps their number was determined by official policy and social divisions were unlikely to influence policy outcomes. As discussed in section 2, the Education Commission Report of 1883 encouraged local boards to develop schools in areas populated by lower castes, aboriginal tribes and Muslims. Although the coefficient for lower castes is statistically insignificant, coefficients on the population share of tribes and Muslims are statistically significant. Land taxes for board schools can be interpreted as a supply-side fiscal variable with the coefficient indicating that a 50% increase in the mean value of land tax increases the mean number of board schools by 26%. Given local councils and their land tax revenues were responsible for the provision of local infrastructure, medical services and primary schooling, the effect on board schools is fairly reasonable.
Specifications 3 and 4 on aided and unaided schools emphasize the significant effect of caste and religious diversity on private provision of primary schools. Two mutually nonexclusive explanations can account for the negative coefficient on CRFI in specification 3 for aided schools. One particular interpretation is related to the notion that greater diversity in the population might be associated with greater economic and political inequality, whereby elite groups enjoy disproportionate shares of economic resources and political influence. Under these conditions elites could actively work to reduce the number of aided schools if they have access to substitutes. In the Indian context, upper castes (particularly Brahmans) were unequally represented on local boards and had the political influence to reduce public grants in more heterogeneous districts either because they were more likely to use secondary schools or because they had stronger preferences for investments on other public services. For example, 46 Urban municipal schools represent a small share of local board schools because the urban population was less than 10% of the total population. Chaudhary (2007) explores the variation in public district board expenditures and finds that districts with larger Brahman populations, specifically those with landed interests, allocated higher expenditures to local infrastructure as compared to primary schooling. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that upper caste board members preferred secondary schools for their children.
47 Both scenarios suggest that upper caste elites could have reduced the number of public grants awarded in more diverse districts, which would lead to fewer aided schools.
An alternate explanation for the observed negative association is related to higher coordination costs in more diverse populations. Aided schools were partially funded through private resources because private individuals applied to local boards for public grants to defray part of the costs of establishing and maintaining an aided school. Heterogeneous preferences between different castes and religions could have undermined the collective ability of a diverse district to come together and establish aided schools. Moreover, Indian social structure perhaps worsened these problems because higher castes were more likely to establish schools when they were direct beneficiaries and so they undervalued the potential social benefits of providing broader primary education. In fact, caste norms prohibited lower castes from attending schools, especially those frequented by upper castes. 48 Given aided schools were funded through a mix of public and private revenues, the effects of diversity probably reflect a combination of unequal political influence and coordination problems.
With regard to privately managed unaided schools, the strong negative coefficient on CRFI is more indicative of coordination problems because these schools did not receive any public funds. While these interpretations of CRFI stress supply-side constraints, low demand for schooling among lower caste populations may have also contributed to fewer unaided and probably even aided schools in more diverse districts. British officials and contemporary historians alike have emphasized that lower caste populations had low demand for education because of poverty, discrimination and higher opportunity costs in terms of a child's time.
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Although fraction lower castes is statistically insignificant, CRFI is positively correlated with fraction lower castes in many provinces, which suggests that low demand may partially account for the observed negative relationship.
While land taxes reflect a supply-side fiscal variable in specification 2 on local board schools, this variable reflects more of an income effect in specification 4 on unaided schools.
But, the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than for local board schools-a 10% increase in the mean value of land taxes increases the average number of unaided schools by 2.24% as compared to just over 5% for board schools. Overall, the findings on primary schools emphasize that greater caste and religious diversity negatively affected the provision of privately managed aided and unaided schools, but the more centralized provincial government schools were largely unaffected by local district characteristics. Specification 5 on all state supported schools (provincial government, local board and aided) also highlights the negative relationship between primary schools and CRFI.
In contrast to primary schooling, the level of diversity is not relevant for secondary schools, where fraction Brahman emerges as the most significant explanatory variable. Table   7 present results on public secondary schools, which also include middle English and middle Given different local factors were important for the provision of primary versus secondary schools, table 8 presents specifications with the ratio of primary to secondary schools as the dependent variable. The interpretation of the ratios for provincial government and local fund school-types is complicated because there were relatively few local fund secondary schools and there were even fewer provincial government primary schools. Although the degree of fragmentation is not relevant for state supported schools, CRFI is extremely significant for the ratio of unaided primary over secondary schools. A 10% increase in the mean value of CRFI, decreases the mean ratio of primary to secondary unaided schools by almost 60%.
Moreover, the ratio of total primary to total secondary schools is also negatively correlated with fraction Brahman. The findings on ratios indicate that there was an undue emphasis on secondary schooling both in districts with larger numbers of Brahmans and in districts with greater diversity. Clearly, elites preferred advanced primary classes in secondary schools versus vernacular primary schools. The negative coefficients on Muslims and aboriginal tribes for total schools reflect the disproportionate number of provincial government secondary schools, which were established as part of colonial policy to promote and increase schooling among these groups.
The school analysis highlights the important relationships between local characteristics and the provision of schools, but it is unclear how strongly schools or other educational inputs were related to outputs like literacy in this period. Therefore, Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include province fixed effects and the dependent variable is defined as (Schools*1000)/ School-Age Population (Ages 5-15) Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include province fixed effects and fraction ages 5 to 15. Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
